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Abstract
We present a novel idea on adequacy testing called “vulnerability coverage.” The introduced coverage measure examines the
underlying software for the presence of certain classes of vulnerabilities often found in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
website. The thoroughness of the test input generation procedure is performed through the adaptation of evolutionary algorithms
namely Genetic Algorithms (GA) and Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO). The methodology utilizes the Common Vulnerability
Scoring System (CVSS), a free and open industry standard for assessing the severity of computer system security vulnerabilities,
as a fitness measure for test inputs generation. The outcomes of these evolutionary algorithms are then evaluated in order to
identify the vulnerabilities that match a class of vulnerability patterns for testing purposes.
Index Terms
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I. INTRODUCTION
The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [3] lists over 1, 644 instances of vulnerabilities identified by their unique
CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) numbers. Some of these vulnerabilities exist partly due to improper settings
of configuration parameters that govern the functionality of the given software. Testing software applications against these
vulnerabilities can become tedious, and as a result, infeasible if the test has to target all the possible settings of a configuration
in order to check the vulnerability of the software against some known attacks. This calls for a systematic configuration
testing framework and mechanism in order to mitigate the efforts put into inspecting the given software by identifying a
narrowed down set of configuration test inputs. However, from vulnerability perspective, it is not easy to check whether the
tests generated for testing examines the software system against certain classes of vulnerabilities. Hence, it makes it impractical
for the administrator to exercise the given software under test against any vulnerability reported in NVD.
To illustrate the overall mechanism of the proposed adequacy coverage, consider an example for vulnerabilities in MySQL.
The “high” severity level of the MySQL CVE-2019-12463 vulnerability is 8.8 out of 10. There are several other vulnerabilities
reported for MySQL with similar patterns as vulnerability vector and with similar severity scores. Then the major testing
question is whether it is essential to examine the software under test for all the reported vulnerabilities with certain CVE
numbers. It is possible to view the problem as an instance of general software testing problem and thus develop a specific
adequacy criterion for covering vulnerabilities and examine the software under test (SUT) for the vulnerabilities.
This paper extends our initial idea [6] on vulnerability coverage and thus presents the novel concept of “vulnerability
coverage,” in an analogous way to conventional adequacy criterion in software testing. We apply evolutionary algorithms to
generate test inputs with certain patterns and use Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) as a primary criterion to
assess the vulnerability coverage (i.r., fitness) of the SUT. The paper makes the following key contributions:
1) We present the idea of vulnerability coverage as a test adequacy criterion for inspecting the given software against certain
types of vulnerabilities (Section III).
2) We perform evolutionary algorithms such as genetic algorithms (GA) and particle swarm optimisations (PSO) to generate
vulnerability vector patterns (Section IV).
3) We compare the performance of both GA and PSO in generating such vulnerability vector patterns (Section V). According
to our results, PSO managed to generate a more stable trend of secure vulnerability vector patterns than that of GA in
a single generation.
We provide relevant background on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is presented in Section II. Section
III presents the idea of vulnerability coverage as an adequacy test criterion. Section IV presents the fitness function for the
evolutionary algorithms. In Section V, we present experimental setup and results. Section VI reviews the related work. Section
VII concludes the paper. Throughout the paper, we will be using the words “vulnerability pattern” and “CVSS vector pattern”
interchangeably.
II. VULNERABILITY SCORING SYSTEM
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is an open-standard industry framework, which helps cyber-security
professionals to seek out information regarding ranking mechanism for the severity of vulnerabilities. CVSS captures the
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2principle characteristics of the vulnerability by assigning a Base score rating ranging from 0 to 10 which is representative
of the ease of exploitation and the damaging effect of the concerned vulnerability where 10.0 is the most easily exploitable
vulnerability. The numerical scores have a qualitative assessment (low, medium, high, and critical) to provide organizations with
better understanding and assessment of vulnerabilities. Some vulnerability are also given temporal and environmental scores
that may modify the base score. As a proof of concept in generating CVSS patterns, the GA and PSO optimization algorithms
are applied to the Base metrics. The Base metric consists of three sub-main metrics where each metric group comprises of a
set of vector fields and the associated values it takes:
• Exploitability Sub-Metric: It addresses how the attack is captured. Table I lists down the vector fields.
• Impact Sub-Metric: It reflects the “characteristics” of the impacted components as shown in Table I.
• Scope Sub-Metric: It is a vector field acting as a separate metric which describes the change in the scope of the attack
by determining whether other components are affected along with the original vulnerability. It accepts only two values:
Unchanged (U) and Changed (C).
Sub-Metric Fields Description Values Score
Exploitability Network(N) 0.85
Adjacent(A) 0.62
Local (L) 0.55Attack Vector (AV)
Reflects the proximity of the attacker to attack
the vulnerable component.
Physical (P) 0.2
Low(L) 0.77Attack Complexity (AC) Reflects the resources and conditions required toconduct the exploit on the vulnerable component. High(H) 0.44
Low(L) 0.62(or 0.68 if Scope is Changed)
High(H) 0.27(or 0.5 if Scope is Changed)Privileges Required (PR)
Represents the level of privileges required by an
attacker to successfully launch an exploit.
None(N) 0.85
None(N) 0.85User Interaction (UI) Reflects whether the participation of the user isrequired for launching a successful attack. Required (R) 0.62
Impact Availability Impact (A) Measures the severity of the attack on the availability
of the impacted component.
Low(L) 0.00
Integrity Impact (I) Measures the severity of the attack on the integrity
of the impacted component.
High(H) 0.22
Confidentiality Impact (C) Measures the severity of the attack on the confiden-
tiality of the impacted component.
None(N) 0.56
TABLE I: Sub-Metrics.
Base score formula is calculated as follows [1]:
Impact Sub− Score(ISS) = 1− [(1− C) ∗ (1− I) ∗ (1− A)] (1)
Impact(IM) =

6.42 ∗ ISS if Scope is Unchanged
7.52 ∗ (ISS − 0.029)
−3.25 ∗ (ISS − 0.02)15 if Scope is Changed
(2)
Exploitability(EX) = 8.22 ∗ AV ∗ AC ∗ PR ∗ UI (3)
Base Score =

0 if Impact <= 0
Round(Min[(IM + EX), 10]) if Scope is Unchanged
Round(Min[1.08 ∗ (IM + EX), 10]) if Scope is changed
(4)
Every known vulnerability’s severity can be represented as a vulnerability/CVSS vector pattern, which comprises all the
aforementioned vector fields. For instance, Figure 1 shows the CVSS score and the vulnerability pattern vector for CVE-2019-
14389 [3]. As shown in the figure, the score for this vulnerability is high and is quantified as 7.8 out of 10. The generated
representation of the vulnerability/CVSS vector is [AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H]. Table II lists the
vector pattern description for this vulnerability.
Parameter Description
AV: L Denotes the vulnerability is exploited by the attacker through
accessing the target system locally (L).
AC: L Represents that the vulnerability has a Low (L) complexity of
being attacked.
PR: L Shows that a Low (L) number of Privileges are required for
successfully exploiting this vulnerability.
UI: N Denotes that no (N) User Interaction and involvement is required
to launch a successful attack.
S: U Shows the Scope (S) of the attack is Unchanged (U).
C: H Total loss (High) of confidentiality.
I: H Total loss (high) of integrity, or a complete loss of protection.
A: H Total loss (High) of availability, full access denial to resources in
the impacted component.
TABLE II: CVSS vector pattern description.
3Fig. 1: The description of CVE-2019-14389 for MySQL.
III. VULNERABILITY COVERAGE AS ADEQUACY TESTING
In an analogous way to the conventional definition given for “code coverage” in software testing, the vulnerability coverage
is a measurement of how many known and reported vulnerabilities of the system under test (SUT) are inspected against.
Similarly, the vulnerability coverage (VC) for a software system (S) can be measured as follows:
V CS =
(#vulnerabilities inspected)S
(Total # of vulnerabilities reported)S
∗ 100 (5)
Where (#vulnerabilities inspected)S is the number of vulnerabilities inspected for the system S, and
(Total # of vulnerabilities reported)S is the total number of vulnerabilities reported for system S. Without loss of generality,
this paper uses vulnerability patterns provided by CVSS score to measure the adequacy testing of vulnerabilities give for a
software system.
It is important to note that vulnerabilities of the same pattern might be found in CVE database directly. However, given
the evolutionary search algorithms presented in this paper, it is possible to identify vulnerabilities of different patterns but
similar CVSS score. Hence, the use of CVSS score, as a fitness function, enables us to identify various forms and patterns
of vulnerabilities within the specific level of CVSS score. Therefore, given the desired level of CVSS score, the problem of
adequacy testing for vulnerability testing will be exercising the vulnerabilities with different patterns but equal CVSS scores.
In following sections, we adopt two evolutionary algorithms that enable us search the input space (i.e., vulnerability pattern)
that achieve a certain level of CVSS score (i.e., the fitness value).
IV. FITNESS FUNCTION: CVSS SCORE
This section explains the genetic and optimization algorithms developed in which CVSS scores are used as fitness functions.
For the ease of naming convention and understanding, we considered each CVSS pattern as a separate configuration in these
algorithms.
A. Genetic Algorithm (GA)
Genetic Algorithms are based on the biological process of evolution. The idea is that over time, a pool of chromosomes
will evolve to be even better (i.e., better fitness value) than the previous generation. A new generation (equal to the pool
size) of chromosomes (i.e., configurations) is created with any iteration of the algorithm. This is achieved by the processes of
selection, crossover, and mutation [9]. A fitness score metric is adopted as a measure to select the two fittest chromosomes
from the pool that are called parent chromosomes. Then crossover takes place between the parents to produce a new child
chromosome, which will have the best traits from both the parents followed by mutating of some of the characteristics of the
child to introduce new traits. This process is repeated until an entirely new generation gets created.
B. GA implementation for secure configuration pool
We implemented the algorithm in Python. We first created a CVSS vector pool with the fitness score of 2.0 (i.e., the best and
more secure fitness score). We refer to vector as a “string” in our implementation. We set the number of iteration/generation
as 50. The entire algorithm (Algorithm 1) is divided into five parts: 1) configuration generation , 2) fitness score, 3) breeder’s
Selection, 4) crossover, and 5) mutation. These parts are explained below in-depth.
1) Initial Configuration Generation: As shown on lines 1 – 9 of Algorithm 1, we created a pool of 100 possible CVSS
vector strings by randomly choosing corresponding permissible values from the ‘val’ list to produce the initial pool of vector
strings.
2) Fitness Score: As shown on lines 11 – 20 of Algorithm 1, the fitness score of the initial population of the vector strings
is evaluated. We imported the cvss [2] python library and thus utilized the base metric score method CVSS3. The CVSS
scores were considered as the fitness scores. The scores were valid if they were in the range of [2.0, 5.5]. Anything outside
of that range was assigned the score as 100. We chose score 5.5 to be the upper limit since it is roughly the average score a
configuration can take to be deemed reasonably secure.
4Algorithm 1 Genetic Alg. for generation of configurations.
1: . Generating initial pool of configuration vectors.
2: procedure CONFIGURATION
3: val = [′H ′,′ L′,′N ′,′A′,′ P ′,′ U ′,′ C ′,′N ′,′R′]
4: vector field = [′AV ′,′AC ′,′ PR′,′ UI ′,′ S′,′ C ′,′ I ′,′A′]
5: for each vf in vector field do
6: vf = random.choice[val] . ’val’ takes permissible set of values based on vf chosen.
7: end for
8: return vector
9: end procedure
10: . Assigning fitness score based on Best score.
11: procedure FITNESS(BestScore, vector)
12: score = CV SS3(vector).score()
13: if (score <= BestScore & score <= 5.5) then
14: fit = score
15: else
16: fit = 100
17: end if
18: Return fit
19: end procedure
20: . Breeder’s Selection: Select best vector samples.
21: procedure SELECTION(population, best sample, lucky few)
22: nextGen = [ ]
23: sortedPop = Sorted(population) . descending order of fitness values = low cvss score to high
24: for i in range(best sample) do
25: nextGen.append(sortedPop[i]) . first ’i’ # of best configurations selected
26: end for
27: for i in range(lucky few) do
28: nextGen.append(random.choice(sortedPop))
29: end for
30: Return nextGen
31: end procedure
32: . Creating new vector from 2 parent vectors.
33: procedure CREATECHILD(vector1, vector2)
34: child vector = ””
35: for i in range(len(vector1)) do
36: if random.random < 0.5 then
37: child vector = child vector + vector1[i]
38: else
39: child vector = child vector + vector2[i]
40: end if
41: end for
42: Return child vector
43: end procedure
44: . Mutating: randomly changing a value of the vector.
45: procedure MUTATION(vector)
46: vf = random.choice(vector field)
47: modify = random.choice(val)
48: index = get position(vf)
49: vector = vector[:index] +modify + vector[index+1:] . inserting ’modify’ in the vector string
50: Return vector
51: end procedure
53) Breeder’s Selection: As shown on lines 21 – 32 of Algorithm 1, we then used Breeder’s selection method. This method
selects a combination of the best solutions generated by the algorithm (i.e., vectors with the low score). Furthermore, in order
to avoid the problem of falling into local minima, the algorithm also picks some lucky few vectors with random vector scores.
4) Crossover: For crossover, As shown on lines 33 – 44 of Algorithm 1, we randomly swapped the values of metrics among
the two parent vectors. We used a random value generator to select which parent vector to use for crossover. If value < 0.5,
parent 1 is chosen, otherwise parent 2 would be the choice.
5) Mutation: As shown on lines 45 – 53 of Algorithm 1, the algorithm performs mutation on the CVSS vector strings by
random selection of vector field whose value is also randomly selected from its permissible set of values.
We ran the GA script 100 times. Each run of the algorithm produced different pool of CVSS vector strings with different
number and combinations of vector of fitness score 2.0.
C. Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) Algorithm
PSO is a widely used swarm-based optimization technique. It draws its inspiration from bee swarm, and bird flocking social
behavior of particles. PSO and GA, both being different forms of evolutionary computation techniques, share some similarities.
Both techniques start off with a random set of initial population/solutions and keep updating generations until it reaches an
optimum solution space with respect to the fitness function. In case of PSO, it is a swarm consisting of various particles,
where each particle represents a solution. Unlike GA, PSO does not make use of crossover and mutation operators to update
the particles. Instead, these techniques are directed towards the global optimum by their personal best position along with the
swarm’s best position in the search space. PSO is also easier to implement than GA and has comparatively fewer parameters
to adjust [7].
D. PSO implementation for secure pool configuration
We compared the performance of GA in generating a set of best configurations with that of PSO. We implemented the PSO
algorithm in Python 3.6. To make the comparison meaningful and fair, the number of iterations and population size (swarm
size) were kept similar to GA, which are 50 and 100, respectively.
The PSO algorithm is described in Algorithm 2. The algorithm takes two list as parameters: 1) pbest_fitness and 2)
particle_vel. These lists maintain the initial pbest fitness and velocity values associated to every particle in a swarm.
We defined swarm as a collection (list) of 100 initial particles whose implementation (line 2) is similar to the procedure
configuration in GA. The algorithm returns a pool of particles with varied scores in each iteration and also stores the
count of particles with score = 2.0 in every iteration in order to check how many most secure particles (configurations) are
generated by PSO. We also focus only on the scores, which belong in the range [2.0, 5.0] in every iteration.
In a nutshell, the algorithm searches for the best fitness and velocity values for each particle until a threshold is reached
(lines 7 – 34). In every iteration (lines 9 – 13), the algorithm picks the pbest_fitness (i.e., particle best) values as their
CVSS scores cvss_fit with the assumption that the fitness would be better (i.e., lesser is better) than its current pbest
fitness value. After the For loop ends, it then picks the global best (gbest) value of the swarm by the the best pbest
value (lines 14 – 16), in this case, the least value.
The next step in the algorithm is to calculate the velocity (lines 17 - 31) where particle vel(particle) fetches the velocity
of the given particle. The lines 18 - 28 describe how the velocity is evaluated for every particle. The velocity metric measures
the distance between the fitness score (pbest) and the best score. The particle is updated whenever its current velocity value
is greater than its previous one.
The particles are updated using update_particle in a similar manner to the configuration mutation in GA. More
specifically, any one out of the eight vector fields (i.e., AV, AC, etc.) is constructed whose value is chosen randomly from its
corresponding set of permissible values. For example, if ‘AV’ is selected, then any value in the list of{H, L, N, A} can be
randomly selected.
The target global best value was set to 10.0, particle velocity in the range [0, 8] where 0 and 8 are the minimum and
maximum number of differences between two particles, respectively. Since each particle (CVSS vector) constitutes of only 8
vector fields (AV, AC, etc). The fitness range is set between the range [2, 10] where 2.0 is deemed as the best fitness score
and 10.0 is the maximum CVSS score any particle can get which means highly unfit.
V. EXPERIMENTATION AND RESULTS
We ran our Python scripts, developed for implementing the GA and PSO algorithms, 100 times on the CVSS population in
order to evaluate the performance of the evolutionary algorithms in generating the most secure patterns. The performance was
measured on the basis of three evaluation metrics:
1) Number of instances of vulnerability patterns with the target score (e.g., score = (2.0, 3.0)) in each run.
2) Mean hamming distance (diversity) of the CVSS vectors.
3) Standard deviation of the scores calculated for the set of population produced.
6Algorithm 2 PSO for generation of configuration.
1: procedure PSO(pbest fitness, particle vel)
2: swarm = [particle() for i in range(swarm size)] . Initialize 100 particles
3: iteration = 0
4: Threshold = 50
5: total count = [ ] . To store count of particles with score = 2.0 in every iteration
6: best score = 2.0
7: while iteration < Threshold do
8: count = 0
9: for each particle do . Calc Fitness
10: if cvss fit(particle) < pbest fitness(particle) then
11: pbest fitness(particle) = cvss fit(particle)
12: end if
13: end for
14: if pbest fitness(particle) < gbest(swarm) then
15: gbest(swarm) = pbest(particle)
16: end if
17: for each particle do . Calc Velocity
18: if pbest fitness(particle)<best score then
19: continue
20: else
21: velocity=pbest(particle)-best score . Current Velocity
22: if velocity == 0.0 then
23: count+=1 . count of particles of score = 2.0
24: end if
25: if velocity < particle vel(particle) then
26: particle vel(particle) = velocity
27: else
28: particle = update particle(particle)
29: end if
30: end if
31: end for
32: iteration+ = 1
33: total count.append(count)
34: end while
35: return total count
36: end procedure
1) Diversity of Vulnerability Patterns: It is important to produce a diverse set of instances of vulnerability vector patterns
to ensure the thoroughness of test inputs (i.e., vulnerability pattern) generation and thus avoid generating redundant test inputs
where test input refers to an instance of vulnerability vector pattern produced by the algorithms. We collected the data for the
three evaluation metrics for various range of target scores including S ∈ 2.0, S ∈ (2.0, 3.0], S ∈ (2.0, 4.0] and S ∈ (2.0,
5.0]. As a representative example, Figure 2 shows the plots for all the aforementioned three metrics for CVSS vector strings
falling into S ∈ (2.0, 3.0] for both GA and PSO.
As expected, the number of instances of the generated vulnerability patterns for each run is smaller for the target score of
2.0 (i.e., most secure) and it is higher when the target fitness score is in range (2.0, 5.0] (i.e., least secure). It implies that when
a lower level of vulnerability is targeted (i.e., more secure with CVSS score = 2.0), there are “not” too many alternatives
for patterns. On the other hand, if the vulnerability levels and security is relaxed (i.e., CVSS score <= 5.0 then over 60
alternatives could be produced for pattern matching. A combination of such varying level of CVSS scores might be beneficial
to increase the search space when implementing a moving target defense platform.
The bar plots depicted in Figure 2.(a) and 2.(d) demonstrate the number of occurrences of CVSS patterns (i.e., y-axis)
against the number of runs (i.e., x-axis) when the target target CVSS scores is (2.0, 3.0) for GA and PSO, respectively. A
glance at the charts indicates that GA is able to generate more instances of the CVSS patterns targeting the desired level of
security (i.e., (2.0, 3.0)).
The scatter plots given in Figure 2.(b)-(e) and Figure 2.(c)-(f) denote distribution of the mean hamming distance and standard
deviation against the runs, respectively. To ease comprehending the trend of the mean values, a regression line is fitted into the
7(a) Histogram Plot (GA) (b) Mean Hamming Distance (GA) (c) Standard Deviation (GA)
(d) Histogram Plot (PSO) (e) Mean Hamming Distance (PSO) (f) Standard Deviation (PSO)
Fig. 2: Histograms, Mean Hamming Distances, Standard Deviations of CVSS vectors for S ∈ (2.0, 3.0].
scatter plots to capture the overall trend. The Hamming distance addresses the “diversity” of the vulnerability vector patterns
generated by the algorithms based on the count of corresponding unequal values of each vector fields among strings. The
smoothing lines for mean values of Hamming distance demonstrate similar trends for each target value for the fitness score.
The mean values of the hamming distance (y-axis) in all the cases remain unchanged over the runs and are mostly scattered
between 3.0 and 3.7 for GA (i.e., a diversity of the vulnerability vector pattern generated) and between 4.5 and 5.5 for PSO.
As demonstrated in scatter plots shown in Figure 2.(b) and 2.(c), the instances generated by the GA algorithm is less diverse
compare to the instances generated by PSO. The mean of the hamming distances between the instances generated by GA and
PSO are 3.45 and 4.93, respectively. This indicates that even though the PSO algorithm generates far fewer instances of CVSS
patterns for the given fitness, it produces more diverse instances of patterns.
To illustrate the variations of such vulnerability patterns generated, plots 2.(c) and 2.(f) illustrate the trend of the values of
the standard deviations for Hamming distance over the runs. There is a light reduction in standard deviations while running
GA for all cases. The observed standard deviations for all cases is somewhere between 0.5 and 1.5. When combined together,
the mean and standard deviations of the hamming distance can serve as an indication of the diversity of the vulnerability vector
patterns produced by the algorithms and thus helps in measuring the thoroughness of test case generation and thus vulnerability
selections in which the generation of redundant patterns (i.e., test inputs) is avoided.
2) The Contributions of Each Permissible Value in each Vector Field: It is also important to investigate whether certain
settings of each vector field contributes to security configuration differently than its counterpart. Table III shows the frequency
(i.e., in terms of percentage) of each value permissible for each vector field, as listed in the base metrics. As reported in Table
III:
– AV: The most contributing value is P (i.e., Physical) for GA (ranging from 45.43 to 59.22%). The PSO algorithm highlights
two values of P and L as the most contributing to the security level of the patterns. This observation indicates that if the
severity of the vulnerability needs to be reduced, no other values or means of attacks (i.e., Network (N), Adjacent (A),
and somewhat Local (L) is allowed for exploiting the vulnerability.
– AC: There is a mixed situation for attack complexity and there is no clear winner between Low (L) and High (H)
complexity level to launch the exploitation.
– S: The dominant setting for this variable is C, except the case for GA when the target score is 2.0.
– UI: There is a mixed situation for the level of user involvement for exposing the vulnerability.
– C: There is also a mixed situation for confidentiality settings among GA and PSO algorithms.
– I: A similar mixed situation for this case. However, it is also observed that in most cases a None (N) risk to integrity is
needed to reduce the impact of exploiting the vulnerability.
– A: Furthermore, there is a a mixed situation for availability where there is no clear dominant setting value.
– PR: The two dominant setting values for the level privileges are L and H.
8Vector Values [2.0] (2.0, 3.0] (2.0, 4.0] (2.0, 5.0]
Field GA PSO GA PSO GA PSO GA PSO
P 59.22 29.29 49.31 23.74 47.85 23.19 45.43 22.25
L 14.02 22.22 21.40 26.75 21.90 26.98 22.32 26.95
A 13.76 26.26 18.67 26.15 18.41 25.25 19.11 25.33
AV
N 12.98 22.22 10.60 23.34 11.83 24.56 13.13 25.45
L 32.98 44.44 48.63 50.90 50.83 50.17 51.85 51.56AC H 67.01 55.55 51.36 49.09 49.16 49.82 48.14 48.4
U 60.25 48.48 47.87 48.39 47.15 48.96 46.50 48.56S C 39.74 51.51 52.12 51.60 52.84 51.03 53.49 51.43
N 33.24 43.43 48.51 50.0 49.30 50.40 49.79 50.70UI R 66.75 56.56 51.48 50.0 50.69 49.59 50.20 49.29
N 62.85 25.25 61.84 31.46 54.77 29.16 53.36 28.88
L 37.14 37.37 38.15 35.67 45.19 36.73 45.82 34.91C
H 0.0 37.37 0.0 32.86 0.02 34.09 0.80 36.20
N 67.27 39.39 64.09 30.46 55.98 27.21 54.54 25.84
L 32.72 34.34 35.90 38.47 43.82 37.88 44.37 35.72I
H 0.0 26.26 0.0 31.06 0.18 34.90 1.07 38.42
N 69.87 26.26 66.70 28.05 58.96 27.95 57.95 27.17
L 30.12 47.47 33.29 37.17 40.98 34.95 41.55 34.01A
H 0.0 26.26 0.0 34.76 0.05 37.08 0.49 38.81
N 40.25 26.26 29.75 28.05 30.81 27.95 30.58 27.17
L 0.0 47.47 29.83 37.17 31.13 34.95 31.70 34.01PR
H 59.74 26.26 40.40 34.76 38.05 37.08 37.71 38.81
TABLE III: % of contribution of each permissible value in all the score ranges across 100 runs of GA and PSO.
(a) GA (b) PSO
Fig. 3: # CVSS patterns with score 2.0 over 50 generations.
We also executed the GA and PSO scripts with single run to sense their performances. Figure 3 illustrates the results of one
run with 50 generations/iterations where y-axis is the number of vulnerability pattern produced whose score = 2.0; whereas,
the x-axis is the generation index (i.e., 50 generations). As it is observed, GA could manage to generate two vulnerability
vector patterns with score 2.0 on its 50-th iteration along with highly unstable trend; whereas, the PSO algorithm demonstrated
a more stable trend with four pattern generated with score 2.0.
VI. RELATED WORK
Crouse and Fulp [4] used genetic algorithms to deploy a Moving Target Defense (MTD) platform and make computer
systems more secure through temporal/spatial diversity in configuration parameters that govern how a system operates. Later
on, they developed an MTD by simulating 256 virtual machines of similarly purposed computers where each computer was
initially configured with an extremely vulnerable configuration making them prone to all sorts of attacks.
Post and Sinz [8] bridged the gap between configuration information and verification process by introducing a new technique
named Configuration Lifting. The technique converts all the variants over which a software is verified into a meta-program
thereby making the application of configuration-aware verification techniques like static analysis, and model checking more
efficient.Dai et al. [5] introduced the concept of configuration fuzzing in order to check the vulnerabilities that appear only
at certain conditions by randomly modifying the configuration of the running application at specific execution points. During
the deployment phase, this technique ceaselessly fuzzes the configuration and looks for a vulnerability that rises due to the
violation of of security invariants.
VII. CONCLUSION
We introduced the novel idea of “vulnerability coverage,” a methodology to examine software under test against certain
classes of vulnerabilities as reported by National Vulnerability Database (NVD) adequately. The introduced idea makes use
of an open industry standard tool called Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) as a metric to measure fitness in
order to generate a pool of vulnerability vector patterns that attains a secure level of CVSS score. For adequacy testing of the
9underlying software, the software under test is then inspected against all those filtered representative sets of vulnerabilities with
similar vulnerability vector pattern that were selected from the generated pool. The paper compared two evolutionary-based
algorithms namely Genetic and Participle Swarm Optimization algorithms on the basis of their performance in generating a
pool of vulnerability patterns and the results indicated a similar performance achieved by both algorithms.
The concept of adequacy criterion is a new approach and hence has a larger scope of improvement. An adequacy criterion
based on vulnerability coverage is a novel technique in the best of our knowledge. This approach can be further improved
by taking into consideration several other metrics including temporal and environmental ones present in CVSS and National
Vulnerability Database (NVD). We also built our experiments based on the range of 2.0 and 5.5. Additional experimentation
would be needed to further study the effect of such range. Moreover, the concept needs tool support and further empirical
studies which can aid in thorough and systematic searching for vulnerabilities reported in the NVD database based on the
matching property for the goal of security testing and then investigate the effectiveness of such adequacy criterion.
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